Hong Kong's changes since the return of sovereignty to China 9 years ago.

SZETO Wah
15th September 2006
Library of Congress, Washington DC.

Hong Kong returned to China in 1997. Has Hong Kong changed? Yes, there have been changes, which may seem subtle, and yet they bear far-flung significance. If you don't live or work in Hong Kong, you may not be aware of these changes. Even for some who call Hong Kong their home, these changes might not be viewed as significant, especially if they have little immediate effect on one's personal life.

Let me talk about a number of aspects concerning Hong Kong's changes and some connected events.

1. The first aspect is changes concerning the legislative and local councils. Before 1997, There were three tiers of councils: the Legislative Council, the Urban Council, and 19 District Boards. I shall talk about them one by one.

1.1 The Legislative Council

1.1.1 According to the Basic Law, legislative councilors elected in 1995 were entitled to a "through train", which allowed them to serve their full terms until 1998. As it turned out, this proviso wasn't observed. The "through train" was dismantled, and the Legislative Council was re-organized into a Provisional Legislative Council, with all the law makers in the democratic camp forced to resign. The Provisional Council revised the electoral laws of the Legislative Council, abolished the Urban Council, reinstated appointed seats in the District Boards, and revoked important legislation passed earlier, e.g. the revised "Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance" and the "Collective Bargaining Ordinance".

1.1.2 The electoral laws of the Legislative Council have been revised in 2 ways. Firstly, the smaller single-seat electoral district was abolished. A proportional representation system with bigger districts was established where the electorate vote for their favourite list of candidates, as opposed to voting for only one candidate. This new arrangement allowed pro-Beijing candidates supported only by a minority of voters to gain a certain proportion of seats. Secondly, the eligibility of voters in a number of functional constituencies was tightened. For instance, previously all employees in the retail trade, in food catering, in Real Estate and Construction, in financial services, etc. were eligible to vote in their respective functional constituencies. But now, only the employers are eligible. This change effectively deprived democratic candidates of their chances of winning those seats.

1.1.3 The voting system within the Legislative Council was also changed. Before the handover to China in 1997, voting for motions or amendments was by simple majority, regardless of whether they were proposed by the government or by council members. After the handover, it is still by simple majority for motions or amendments, but only for those put forward by the government. When they are put forward by council members, voting is done in two separate groups, one formed by directly elected members, and the other by members from the functional constituencies. Only when both groups vote in favour of the motion is it considered carried. When any one group rejects it, the motion is lost. As a result, many motions and amendments that are favoured by the majority of the whole council and the majority of the directly elected members are lost, just because only a minority within the functional group favours them. In this way, the government has rejected numerous motions and amendments initiated by council members by relying on the conservative pro-Beijing members from the functional constituencies.

1.2 The Urban Council

1.2.1 The Urban Council was a regional body that existed before Hong Kong returned to China. The councilors were all directly elected in small single-seat constituencies. The council had independent financial power. It was responsible for the cultural, recreational, environmental and hygiene services of the city. One year after sovereignty was returned to China, the Urban Council was eliminated, its functions being taken over by the Food, Environment and Health Department. A democratic council bearing the nature of regional self-government was abolished just like that.

1.2.2 The Urban Council, being in the middle of the three tiers of councils, also served the important function of a stepladder that nurtured and trained politicians. Most councilors ran for District Board elections first, then Urban Council elections, and then Legislative Council elections. Once the Urban Council was abolished, there appeared a discontinuity in the training path or career path of politicians, especially for those in the democratic camp, who are seldom propped up by the government.

1.3 The District Boards

Although the 19 District Boards are only consultative bodies, they are closest to the people, and often the easiest channel through which the lower-middle classes voice their opinion. Before 1997, the boards were all directly elected, consisting of around 400 board members. After 1997, 104 more seats (which is more than one quarter of the total) were added, and they were to be filled by appointed members. It is the government who appoint these members, who are all pro-government and pro-Beijing. These appointed members were distributed among the boards according to the proportion of democratic members, so as to prevent the latter from forming a majority in any individual district board. In this way, when so-called public opinion is being collected, many district boards become mere tools of the government.

2. Next, I'm going to talk about how the Basic Law was interpreted by the National People's Congress on three occasions.

2.1 According to the stipulation of the Basic Law, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (or the SCNPC) has the power to interpret the Basic Law, but then

2.1.1 it is limited to interpreting only the provisions concerning national defence, diplomatic relations and the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (or SAR); (as for the provisions concerning affairs within the bounds of autonomy of the SAR, it is up to the courts in the SAR to interpret them)

2.1.2 the SCNPC is to interpret the relevant provisions only when the courts of the SAR seek interpretation from them; and

2.1.3 judgments previously rendered by the Court of Final Appeal shall not be affected by any subsequent interpretations of the SCNPC.

2.2 After Hong Kong's return to China, the SCNPC has interpreted the Basic Law on three occasions, but the above stipulations have been breached in all of them.

2.2.1 In 1999, the Court of Final Appeal made a final judgement according to Article 24, Chapter 4 of the Basic Law over the right of abode of children of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong parents. But this was overturned by an interpretation from the SCNPC, which was sought by the SAR government.

2.2.2 In 2003, there was a strong demand among Hong Kong people that the review of the electoral laws in 2007, as scheduled in the Basic Law, must introduce direct elections for the Chief Executive and the whole Legislative Council, or in other words, universal suffrage for the duo elections of 07 and 08. Even before the review unfolded, the government sought interpretation from the SCNPC, which overruled universal suffrage in those two elections.

2.2.3 In 2005, the Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa resigned before his term was over. The question arose whether his successor's term was to be Tung's remaining 2 years or the full 5 years of a normal chief executive. Again the government sought interpretation from the SCNPC even before Hong Kong people discussed the question. The answer came back and it was to be 2 years. But then they did not decide on how long the term will be if the same thing happens again. The SCNPC interpretation applied only to this particular case, that a succeeding chief executive should serve the remaining of the term of the one who has resigned. It can be otherwise another time.

2.3 Now, it is clear that all 3 occasions of interpretation breached the Basic Law itself.

2.3.1 First, all 3 issues pertained to affairs within the bounds of autonomy of the SAR, having nothing to do with national defence, diplomatic relations or the relationship between the Central Government and the Hong Kong SAR.

2.3.2 Second, none of the interpretations were sought by the Court of Final Appeal. They were sought by the SAR government instead.

2.3.3 And Third, the interpretation on the right of abode case in 1999 did affect the earlier judgement rendered by the Court of Final Appeal. The earlier judgement was overturned.

2.4 It must be noted that these interpretations of the Basic Law bore dire consequences.

2.4.1 They breached the provisions stated in black and white in the Basic Law.

2.4.2 Such interpretations amount to revision of the Basic Law devoid of any proper procedure.

2.4.3 They affect the independence of the judiciary, since the guaranteed power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong SAR has been deprived.

3. The third kind of changes since 1997 concerns tighter control of the press and self-censorship.

3.1 Nowadays, among the press in Hong Kong, including radios, televisions, newspapers and magazines, most of them are being controlled or are exercising self-censorship. Most media is supportive of the government, smears the democratic camp and evades issues that may shed a bad light on China. Even if some of them look neutral, they are merely "scolding light and helping heavy", as they are still bounded by the mechanism of a free market, and thus constrained in their deception of the readership.

3.2 There have been various ways to control the press.

3.2.1 One. Media corporations have been bought through pro-Beijing tycoons and through businessmen closely involved in commercial interest with China.

3.2.2 Two. Advertisements have been given to or withdrawn from the media by pro-Beijing commercial interest, especially those in real estate business.

3.2.3 Three. Some of the press have been given exclusive news stories from the government, while others have been excluded from important but unofficial "news briefings".

3.2.4 Four. The permission to acquire subscribers in the mainland has been an effective lure.

3.2.5 Five. Reporters and editors have been bribed or bought over. Some media organizations have been infiltrated by pro-Beijing personnel.

3.2.6 Six. Restrictions have been imposed on some reporters' freedom of travel into the mainland. Some journalists reporting from China have been arrested and imprisoned.

4. The 4th aspect of the changes is the launching of the Principal Officials Accountability System.

4.1 In 2002, after Tung Chee Hwa assumed his second term of office as the chief executive, a "Principal Officials Accountability System" was launched. 14 top officials were politically appointed, answerable only to the chief executive. The new system affects Hong Kong politics in the following ways.

4.2 It damaged the established civil service system, where principal officials had been promoted from below. Appointment by the chief executive made it easier for pro-Beijing politicians to enter the top echelons of the government.

4.3 The Chief Secretary for Administration was stripped of much of his power. Previously, he was the head of the civil service, supervising all the policy bureaus. Now, all power rests in the hand of the chief executive, and so Beijing, through him, can dictate its wishes upon the major government secretaries and the directors of the bureaus.

4.4 Recently, the Government has published a Consultation Document on "Further Development of the Political Appointment System", proposing the creation of Deputy Directors of Bureau and Assistants to Directors of Bureau. It is foreseeable that people from the pro-Beijing parties will assume these new positions. This is a method to further nurture and train pro-Beijing politicians.

5. Another change in Hong Kong is reflected in the attempted legislation of Article 23 of the Basic Law.

5.1 Article 23 reads, "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets , to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies."

5.2 This article has been revised after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, with obviously stricter and targeted prohibitions. As it turned out, the proposed bill in 2003 seriously trampled upon the freedoms and human rights to which Hong Kong people are entitled. They would be deprived of those rights if it became law.

5.3 On July 1, 2003, half a million people marched on the streets in protest, shouting "Down with Article 23. Political power back to the people." Regardless, Tung Chee Hwa and the Executive Council still insisted on enacting the laws on July 9. Being aware of the strong public opinion against the bill, James Tien of the Liberal Party announced that he was resigning from the Executive Council and that his party members would no longer support it. As a result, there would not be sufficient votes in the legislative council to pass the law. Thence the government postponed the reading of the bill indefinitely. The subsequent stepping down of Regina Yip, the secretary for security, and of Tung Chee Hwa himself had to do with these events. This may be regarded as an important victory of the democratic movement of Hong Kong after sovereignty returned to China.

5.4 Although the legislation of Article 23 has been postponed indefinitely, the government, relying on the support of pro-Beijing legislators, has recently forced through a revision of the "Interception of Communications and Surveillance Ordinance", by overturning nearly 200 amendments proposed by various democratic law makers. Although this Ordinance is not as severe as Article 23, it is still a draconian law that infringes upon privacy and human rights.

6. Yet another change has to do with a political reform package in 2005.

6.1 In 2003, Hong Kong people's much insisted universal suffrage in the duo elections of the Legislative Council and Chief Executive of 07 and 08 was ruled out by an interpretation of the Basic Law by the SCNPC. The government subsequently proposed a political reform package, which was, in reality, regression in the name of reform.

6.2 The reform package proposed an increase of 5 functional constituency seats, to be elected by members of the district boards. But the appointed seats in the district boards would remain. It was also not specified how the election was going to be conducted, whether it's a one-person-one-vote system, or whether it's a one-person-multiple-votes system. In the latter case the pro-Beijing camp would be able to take all 5 seats.

6.3 There would also be an increase of 5 directly elected seats, but these seats would still be elected through proportional representation in large constituencies. The pro-Beijing camp would be able to win proportionally 40% (or 2) of the 5 new seats.

6.4 If this reform package was adopted, a serious consequence would be that future reforms would follow the same direction of parallel increases of seats in the geographical constituencies and the district board functional constituency, which would be claimed to be a "gradual" approach towards democracy, while in fact the one-third of seats presently occupied by law makers of the democratic camp would be eroded. If the pan-democrat ratio decreased to below one-third, they would lose their power to veto revisions of the political system, and Beijing would be free to revise the system in whatever way she wants.

6.5 On 4th December, 2005, 250,000 people demonstrated on the streets to oppose this reform package. They supported the negative votes of the democratic camp, stabilizing a few wavering members among them. As a result, the package was voted down by 25 council members. This was the second big victory of the democratic movement of Hong Kong after it's return to Chinese sovereignty, following the victory over the attempted legislation of Article 23.

7. The 7th aspect about the changes in Hong Kong concerns the two slogans "One country, two systems" and "One central theme, two basic points".

7.1 On his return to power in 1979, Deng Xiao Ping stated that China's overall political line to take was "One central theme, two basic points". The "one central theme" was economic reconstruction. The "two basic points" referred to, on the one hand, opening up the country and economic reform, and, on the other hand, "the four insist's". By "the four insist's", he actually meant the insistence on the one-party dictatorship of the communist party.

7.2 Deng was shrewd. He knew if the economy didn't develop, and if the livelihood of the people didn't improve, it would ultimately cause the downfall of the Communist Party. On the other hand, he also knew economic development through opening up the country and economic reform will necessarily give rise to demands of political reform from the people, and so "the four insist's" would have to be employed to suppress political reform.

7.3 The slogan "One country, two systems" for Hong Kong and the slogan "One central theme, two basic points" for China came from the same origin and represent the same spirit. On the one hand, Hong Kong's capitalist system must be maintained to support China's economic development and to keep the Hong Kong economy stable. On the other hand, democracy in Hong Kong must be clamped down, with power tightly controlled from behind the scene, especially to prevent any political influences on the mainland.

7.4 I had been a member of the drafting committee of the Basic Law for 4 years, before being expelled in 1989, for having supported the democratic movements of China that culminated in the Tiananmen Massacre. I became aware, in those 4 years, of the strategy of the Communist Party on resuming sovereignty of Hong Kong. In the first 5 years, no drastic actions would be taken, so as to keep local and international confidence. In the following 5 years, control would be gradually tightened. In 10 years time, Hong Kong would be under total control. That was why the Basic Law stipulated that there could be a review in 2007 for political reform. They had thought that even if there were universal suffrage in 2007, the pro-Beijing forces would win the elections. As it turned out, this smug calculation was upset by the constant growth of people's power, which they failed to anticipate. But the Chinese communists have not dropped the idea of gaining complete control over Hong Kong.

8. Lastly, I'm going to conclude by saying a few words on the road of democracy of Hong Kong.

8.1 Hong Kong is part of China. The Democratic Movement of Hong Kong is likewise part of the Democratic Movement of China. Their destinies are closely intertwined. If there is no political reform towards democracy in China, neither is there any room in Hong Kong for further democratization that may go beyond the status quo. The road of democracy for China is bumpy, tortuous, arduous and protracted. And so it is for Hong Kong, too.

8.2 On the eve of Hong Kong's return to China, I put up a slogan, "No retreat. No retrogression." By "no retreat", I meant, first, not to emmigrate from Hong Kong, and second, to persist on in the democratic movement. By "no retrogression", I meant encouraging opposition to any decline in freedom, human rights and the rule of law. Now, without the democratization of China, it is difficult for democracy to even inch forward in Hong Kong. But then, even if there is no progress in democracy in Hong Kong, we still have to prevent and oppose any decline in freedom, human rights and the rule of law. In a situation of no retrogression, we can wait for the development of the democratic movements in China to catch up, and then to move forward together. We shall also strengthen people's power in our struggle to counter retrogression.

8.3 After returning to China, Hong Kong has indeed strengthened its people's power. As mentioned above, the opposition to the attempted legislation of Article 23 and the opposition to the attempted political reform package were both victories of anti-retrogression, where people's power has been strengthened. So, I have revised the slogan "No retreat. No retrogression." that I put up before the handover into a new one, "Oppose retrogression. Develop people's power." People's power must be constantly strengthened, so as to serve as preparation to welcome a democratic Hong Kong in a democratic China.

8.4 Strategically, we should look down upon the enemy, because the current of history towards democracy is unstoppable. Democracy will triumph. But tactically, we should take the enemy seriously, because that enemy is the strongest of dictators and the fiercest of oppressors. Hence let us be prepared to tread a most bumpy, tortuous, arduous and protracted path.

Thank you.